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Abstract Two experiments investigated whether moral
evaluations of organ transplantation influence judg-
ments of death and causation. Participants’ beliefs about
whether an unconscious organ donor was dead and
whether organ removal caused death in a hypothetical
vignette varied depending on the moral valence of the
vignette. Those who were randomly assigned to the
good condition (vs. bad) were more likely to believe
that the donor was dead prior to organ removal and that
organ removal did not cause death. Furthermore, atti-
tudes toward euthanasia and organ donation indepen-
dently predicted judgments of death and causation, re-
gardless of experimental condition. The results are
discussed in light of the framework of motivated rea-
soning, in which motivation influences the selection of
cognitive processes and representations applied to a
given domain, as well as Knobe’s person-as-moralist
model, in which many basic concepts are appropriately
imbued with moral features. On either explanatory
framework, these data cast doubt on the psychological
legitimacy of the mainstream justification for vital organ
procurement from heart-beating donors, which holds
that neurological criteria for death are scientifically jus-
tified, independently of concerns about organ transplan-
tation. These data suggest that, rather than concluding
that organ removal is permissible because the donor is
dead, people may believe that the donor is dead because
they believe organ removal to be permissible.
Keywords Death . Brain death . Organ transplantation .
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Introduction
The practice of organ transplantation is premised on an
ethical constraint known as the dead donor rule, which
states that the removal of vital organs must not cause the
death of the donor. This deontic constraint forbids the
causing of one patient’s death in order to benefit others,
even if the patient is unconscious, debilitated, or very
near death [1]. It serves to protect vulnerable patients
from exploitation, to maintain public trust in the trans-
plantation enterprise, and has been described as Ba cen-
terpiece of the social order’s commitment to respect for
persons and human life^ ([1], p. 6). The majority of
transplant organs are procured from patients who have
been declared dead by neurologic criteria, or, Bbrain
dead^, and thus the removal of organs from these pa-
tients is believed to accord with the dead donor rule.
Furthermore, the prevailing view holds that from a
biomedical perspective, neurological and circulatory
criteria for the determination of death are simply two
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of human death [2]. According to this view, neurological
criteria for death are based on sound biomedical science
and philosophical reasoning, and are justified indepen-
dently of other concerns, including organ transplanta-
tion [3].
Although mostly accepted in the medical and legal
communities [4], neurological criteria for death are con-
troversial. Scholars have argued that brain death is in-
sufficient for the death of a human organism in a bio-
logical sense, since patients who meet diagnostic criteria
for brain death retain the capacity to function as an
integrated whole in the maintenance of homeostasis
and resistance of entropy [5, 6]. Furthermore, some
argue that rather than reflecting an advance in the
scientific understanding of death, the concept of
brain death embodies or reflects an implicit moral
evaluation, specifically, that it is permissible to
remove vital organs in the condition of devastating
neurological injury known as brain death [7, 8].
Thus, rather than concluding that organ removal is
permissible because the donor is dead, perhaps
people believe that the donor is dead because they
believe organ removal to be permissible.
In this article, we describe two experiments designed
to ascertain whether people’s moral evaluations of organ
transplantation influence their judgments of death and
causation in an organ removal scenario. We situate the
results within the framework of motivated reasoning, in
which motivation influences the selection of cognitive
representations applied to a given domain. In the dis-
cussion section, we also consider an alternative theoret-
ical framework for interpreting the results, similar to
Knobe’s person-as-moralist model [9], in which the
concepts of death and causation are treated as partially
moral concepts, rather than value-neutral factual con-
cepts (cf. [7]). Finally, we discuss the implications of
these results for the bioethical debate on death and organ
transplantation.
Motivated Reasoning and Organ Transplantation
Motivated reasoning is an empirically well-validated
framework that explains people’s reasoning processes
in terms of an interaction of motivational and cognitive
processes. Motivation – that is, any wish, desire, or
preference to reach a particular conclusion – impacts
the reasoning process by influencing the selection of
cognitive processes and representations applied to a
given reasoning problem in such a way that the outcome
of the reasoning process is biased towards the preferred
conclusion [10]. Motivated reasoning has been found in
a variety of domains, including beliefs about the self and
others [10, 11], and in moral cognition [12].
Particularly relevant to the present context, there are a
series of findings of motivated reasoning involving
blame, causation, and harm. Alicke [13, 14] found that
people tend to interpret relevant facts about a given
situation in a way that validates a prior assessment of
blame. For example, people were more likely to blame
the driver of a car for being involved in an accident
when he was speeding home to hide a vial of cocaine
from his parents, than when he was speeding home to
hide an anniversary present. In accordance with moti-
vated reasoning, people were also more likely to judge
the driver as the cause of the accident when he was
speeding home to hide cocaine (vs. an anniversary pres-
ent), thus validating their prior assessment of blame,
even though all other factors were the same between
the two cases [13]. In a legal context, Sood and Darley
[15] found motivated reasoning about the concept of
harm. Participants were more likely to assert that harm is
caused by some distasteful action (such as washing a
sidewalk with the flag) when they believed that the law
requires showing the occurrence of harm in order to
criminalize the behavior they found distasteful. Howev-
er, when not constrained by demonstrable harm as a
requirement of criminalization, participants who found
the action distasteful and wished to see it criminalized
did not assert that it caused harm, thus demonstrating
that judgments of harm were recruited in a motivated
fashion in order to justify their preference for criminal-
ization. Similarly, Miller et al. [16] have argued that
much of what is taken as received wisdom in medical
ethics relies on a series of moral fictions [16] or moral
bias [5], which involve the motivated misinterpretation
of facts about causation and intention in order to allow
accepted medical practices at the end of life, such as
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, to appear consis-
tent with traditional norms, such as that doctors must not
cause death. Although plausible, they do not present
experimental evidence for motivated reasoning in this
specific context.
The theoretical framework of motivated reasoning is
useful for investigating beliefs about death and organ
transplantation. If an observer were to judge organ re-
moval from a given donor as morally good or as not
blameworthy, then according to the motivated reasoning
model, that observer would be motivated to interpret the
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scenario in a way that validates the observer’s ethical
judgment, for example, by concluding that the act of
removing organs did not cause death, and that the donor
was already dead before organs were removed. On the
other hand, were an observer to judge organ removal as
morally bad or as blameworthy, then this would create a
motivation to interpret the scenario differently, by con-
cluding that the donor was still alive when organs were
removed, and that organ removal was the cause of death.
In light of this background, we predicted that peo-
ple’s beliefs about whether an unconscious organ donor
was dead and whether organ removal caused death in a
hypothetical vignette would vary depending on whether
the vignette was framed as morally good or bad. Partic-
ipants presented with the good scenario would be more
likely to judge that the unconscious donor was already
dead prior to organ removal and that organ removal did
not cause death, as compared to the bad scenario. Fur-
ther, we expected that individual differences in attitudes
toward organ transplantation and euthanasia would pre-
dict participants’ beliefs about whether the organ donor
was dead, and whether organ removal caused death,
regardless of experimental condition. That is, partici-
pants with more favorable attitudes toward organ dona-
tion in general would be more likely to believe that the
donor was dead and organ removal did not cause death
than those with less favorable attitudes, regardless of
whether they read the morally good or bad scenario.
Conversely, participants with less favorable attitudes
toward euthanasia would be more likely to believe that
the donor was alive and that organ removal caused death




Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk, an online crowdsourcing platform that has
been successfully used in experimental psychological
research [17, 18]. Recruitment was limited to individ-
uals 18 years of age or older who resided in the United
States. To estimate the necessary sample size we con-
ducted a power analysis in which we expected a mod-
erate effect of experimental condition and small effects
of the attitudes scales (described below). A sample size
of 223 was associated with 80 % power to detect the
hypothesized effects. To account for participants who
would be excluded (e.g., incomplete responses and at-
tention check failures), an additional 50 participants
were allowed to participate in the study.
A total of 273 participants enrolled in the study. The
final sample size was reduced to 219 after removing
participants with incomplete responses (e.g., completed
the first question only; n=22), participants who failed at
least one of four attention checks (e.g., failed to type a
specific phrase; n=17), and participants who completed
the study more than once as indicated by a duplicate IP
address (n=15). If an individual completed the study
more than once we included the first completed set of
results in the database. Mean age was 38 years (SD=14)
and 61 % of participants were female.
In addition to standard demographics, we collected
information on potential confounds such as professional
training, experience with brain death or organ transplan-
tation, and religious beliefs. See Table 1 for details on
demographics and background characteristics.
Procedures and Materials
The study was approved by the Florida State University
Human Subjects Committee. After providing informed
consent, participants completed an approximately
10-min online survey for which they received a small
payment. To account for possible order effects, the study
used a 2 (moral valence: good vs. bad) X 2 (order: read
vignette first vs. completed attitudes scales first)
between-subjects factorial design. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to read a vignette about an organ trans-
plant scenario that was framed to occur under circum-
stances that differed in moral valence (details below).
Participants completed all outcome measures immedi-
ately after reading the vignette regardless of order.
Instructions made clear that there are no right or wrong
answers for these questions and that we were interested
in participants’ personal opinions. Finally, participants
answered demographic and background questions. At
the end of the study, we emphasized to participants that
the vignettes were fictional.
Vignette The aim of the vignette was to describe a
patient in an irreversible apneic coma (using lay terms)
who might be a candidate for organ donation, though
without using potentially confounding terms such as
Bdeath^ or Bbrain death^. Furthermore, the two
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conditions were constructed to be the same in every
relevant way except for the experimental manipulation
of moral valence. While we have labeled the conditions
as Bgood^ and Bbad^, the key aspect of the design is the
contrast between the two conditions, with the bad con-
dition being of more obviously negative moral valence
than the good condition. If our hypothesis is correct, we
would expect that the difference in moral valence be-
tween the conditions would influence participants’ judg-
ments of death and causation.
The scenario began the same way for all participants,
where they read about a man named John who had been
severely injured in a car accident.
John has been in a very bad car accident. He
suffered a severe head injury and is now in the
hospital. As a result of the injury, John is
completely unconscious. He cannot hear or feel
anything, cannot remember or think about any-
thing, and his condition is irreversible. John will
never wake up. He also cannot breathe without
mechanical support, but he is on a breathing ma-
chine that keeps his lungs working. Without the
machine, John’s heart and all of his other organs
would stop within minutes.
Then participants read about the circumstances under
which John’s organs had been removed. Approximately
half of participants read the morally good scenario and
half read the morally bad scenario.
Table 1 Participant Demographics, Background Characteristics
and Attitudes for Study 1 and 2






Age (years) 38.4 (14.1) 33.1 (11.4)
Gender
Male 85 (39) 136 (51)
Female 133 (61) 129 (48)
Transgender 1 (<1) 2 (<1)
English native language
Yes 216 (99) 262 (99)
No 2 (1) 4 (2)
Race/Ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic 177 (81) 201 (75)
Black, non-Hispanic 10 (5) 21 (8)
Hispanic 12 (6) 18 (7)
American Indian/Alaskan Native 1 (<1) 1 (<1)
Asian/Pacific Islander 12 (6) 16 (6)
Multiracial 7 (3) 10 (4)
Education
Elementary 0 (0) 1 (<1)
Some high school 3 (1) 1 (<1)
High school graduate or GED 32 (15) 22 (8)
Some college or technical school 79 (36) 119 (45)
College graduate 104 (48) 124 (46)
Religious affiliation
Buddhist 2 (1) 9 (3)
Christian (All) 107 (49) 118 (44)
Hindu 1 (<1) 0 (0)
Jewish 5 (2) 3 (1)
Muslim 3 (1) 4 (1)
None 85 (39) 118 (44)
Other 16 (7) 15 (6)
How religiousa 4.2 (3.3) 3.7 (3.2)
Background characteristicsb
Know someone who donated an
organ while living
41 (19) 52 (20)
Know someone who donated an
organ after death
74 (34) 60 (23)
Know someone who has received
an organ transplant
80 (37) 74 (28)
Received education about organ
donation
130 (59) 142 (53)
Personally seen a person who was
diagnosed as Bbrain dead^ or
Bdead by neurologic criteria^
49 (22) 48 (18)
Health professional 11 (5) 19 (7)
Table 1 (continued)






Attitudes toward organ donationc 60.3 (8.6) 60.0 (8.6)
Attitudes toward euthanasiad 30.3 (9.3) 30.6 (8.9)
Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding error
a Participants selected a number from 1 (not religious) to 10 (very
religious) in response to the statement: BI view myself as…^
b Number (percentage) responding Byes^ to each statement
c Scores range from 18–72 with higher scores indicating a more
favorable attitude toward organ donation
d Scores range from 10–50 with higher scores indicating a more
favorable attitude toward euthanasia
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[Good condition:] John has a signed organ donor
card, and his family has agreed to organ donation.
They know that he wanted to donate his organs,
and they believe that by giving the gift of life and
saving up to 6 other people’s lives with his organs,
at least they can find some meaning from this
senseless tragedy. With the family’s permission,
the hospital staff take John to the operating room
while he is still on the breathing machine, and the
surgeon removes John’s liver, pancreas, both kid-
neys, heart, and lungs, and transplants them into
other patients.
[Bad condition:] John has a signed living will
stating that he does not want to donate any organs
for religious reasons, and his family, who share his
religion, are opposed to organ donation. They
know that he did not want to donate his organs,
and they believe that by violating his wishes they
would only make this senseless tragedy worse.
The transplant surgeon knows that John and his
family have refused organ donation, but thinks to
himself, BI don’t care at all what this bum wanted
or what his family wants. I hate them because of
their race, and because of their religion. I’m going
to take his organs because it will let them know
that they are not welcome in this hospital.^ In the
middle of the night when his family went home to
get some much needed rest, the hospital staff take
John to the operating room while he is still on the
breathing machine, and the surgeon removes
John’s liver, pancreas, both kidneys, heart, and
lungs, and transplants them into other patients.
Measures
Outcome Measures Immediately after reading the vi-
gnette participants were asked to rate their agree-
ment with the following statements using a 5-point
Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=
unsure; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree): BJohn was al-
ready dead before his organs were removed.^ BThe
surgeon caused John’s death.^ BThe surgeon is re-
sponsible for John’s death.^ Afterward, participants
rated the same three items using a forced-choice
Byes^ or Bno^ scale with the following instructions:
BIf you had to choose just one, would you say that:
John was already dead…^ Responses of yes were
coded as 1 and responses of no were coded as 0.
Finally, participants were asked BWhat would be the
best description of how John died?^ and selected
one response from the following choices: 1=The
car accident was the only cause of John’s death;
2=The car accident was mostly the cause of John’s
death, though the surgeon contributed by removing
John’s organs; 3=The car accident and the surgeon
played an equal role in John’s death; 4=The sur-
geon’s removal of John’s organs was mostly the
cause of John’s death, though the car accident con-
tributed; 5=The surgeon was the only cause of
John’s death.
Attitudes Toward Organ Donation The Organ Dona-
tion Attitude Scale (ODAS) [19] is an 18-item val-
idated scale for assessing attitudes toward organ
donation. Participants indicate their agreement with
each statement on a 4-point Likert scale (1=strongly
disagree to 4=strongly agree). Sample statements
include: BI support organ donation^ and BI believe
that organ donation is against my religion^ (reverse
scored). Items are summed to create a scale score
that can range from 18–72, with higher scores indi-
cating more positive attitudes toward organ dona-
tion. Coefficient alpha for the ODAS was .92. (See
Table 1 for descriptive statistics.)
Attitudes Toward Euthanasia The Attitudes Toward Eu-
thanasia scale (ATE) [20] is a 10-item validated scale for
assessing attitudes toward euthanasia. Participants indi-
cate their agreement with each statement on a 5-point
Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree,
where 3=undecided). Of note, none of the statements
use the word Beuthanasia.^ The conceptual dimensions
reflected in the scale include the active/passive distinc-
tion (i.e., Bkilling vs. letting die^), the reason for the
termination of life (severe pain, no possibility of recov-
ery), and locus of decision-making (patient request,
doctor’s decision). Sample statements include: BIt is
okay for a doctor to administer enough medicine to
end a patient’s life if the doctor does not believe that
they will recover,^ and BIt is okay for a doctor to remove
a patient’s life-support and let them die if the doctor
thinks that the patient’s pain is too severe.^ Items are
summed to create a scale score that can range from 10–
50, with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes
toward euthanasia. Coefficient alpha for the ATE scale
was .92. (See Table 1 for descriptive statistics.)
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Results
Randomization Checks
To assess whether randomization was successful, we
used t-tests and chi-square analyses to compare partici-
pants in the morally good vs. bad condition on demo-
graphics, background characteristics, and attitudes.
With one exception, participants in the two conditions
were not significantly different from each other in regard
to demographic variables, background characteristics,
or attitudes (data not shown). A higher percentage of
participants in the good condition (41 %) reported
knowing someone who had donated an organ after death
relative to participants in the bad condition (27 %), χ2
(1, N=219)=5.01, p=.032. However, this difference
was no longer statistically significant after adjusting
for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni correction,
p=.05/16=.003).
Effect of Condition, Order, and Their Interaction
on Outcome Measures
We used analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to examine
effects of experimental condition (good vs. bad), order
(vignette first vs. attitude scales first), and the condition
by order interaction on the Likert-rating outcome vari-
ables, controlling for attitudes toward organ donation
and attitudes toward euthanasia. (Effects of the attitude
variables are reported further below.) After centering all
predictor variables [21], we used logistic regression to
examine effects of condition, order, and the condition by
order interaction on the forced-choice (yes/no) outcome
variables, again controlling for the two attitudes scales.
In these analyses, the bad condition served as the refer-
ence group. All statistical tests were two-tailed.
John was Already Dead We observed a significant ef-
fect of experimental condition on participants’ Likert
rating of whether John was already dead before his
organs were removed. (See Table 2 for means and
percentages of outcome variables for participants in
the morally good vs. bad condition.) Relative to partic-
ipants in the bad condition, participants in the good
condition were more likely to agree that John was al-
ready dead before his organs were removed,F (1, 204)=
45.37, p<.001, partial η2=.18. No order effects emerged
and the condition by order interaction was non-signifi-
cant. Likewise, a significant effect of condition was
observed for the forced-choice version of this item,
Wald=27.00, p<.001, OR=5.35, 95 % CI [2.84,
10.08]. Participants in the good condition were over 5
times more likely to state that the patient was already
dead.
The Surgeon Caused John’s Death We observed a sig-
nificant effect of condition on participants’ perceptions
of whether the surgeon caused John’s death. Participants
in the good (vs. bad) condition were less likely to agree
that the surgeon caused John’s death, F (1, 204)=58.29,
p<.001, partial η2=.22. No order or interaction effects
emerged. This effect of condition was also observed for
the forced-choice version of this item, Wald=34.31,
p<.001, OR=0.14, 95 % CI [0.07, 0.27]. Participants
in the good condition were 86 % less likely to state that
the surgeon caused John’s death.
The Surgeon is Responsible for John’s Death A similar
pattern was observed for participants’ perceptions of
whether the surgeon is responsible for John’s death.
Participants in the good (vs. bad) condition were less
likely to agree that the surgeon was responsible for
John’s death, F (1, 204)=86.19, p<.001, partial
η2=.30. No order or interaction effects emerged. This
effect of condition was also observed the forced-choice
version of this item, Wald=44.94, p<.001, OR=0.08,
95 % CI [0.04, 0.16]. Participants in the good condition
were 92 % less likely to state that the surgeon was
responsible for John’s death.
Best Description of John’s Death We observed a signif-
icant effect of condition on participants’ ratings of the
best description of John’s death, F (1, 204)=48.94,
p<.001, partial η2=.19. Participants in the morally good
condition largely endorsed the car accident as the sole
cause of John’s death whereas participants in the bad
condition attributed John’s death to both the car accident
and the surgeon. No order effects emerged and the
condition by order interaction was non-significant.
Effects of Attitudes toward Organ Donation
and Euthanasia on Outcome Measures
Attitudes toward organ donation and euthanasia were
included in all of the models described above to assess
whether these variables predicted responses to the out-
come variables over and above the effect of
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experimental condition. A small positive correlation
was observed between the ODAS and ATE, r
(208)=.15, p=.028.
John was Already Dead We observed a significant ef-
fect of attitudes toward euthanasia such that participants
who held less favorable attitudes toward euthanasia
were less likely to agree that John was dead prior to
the organ removal surgery, F (1, 204)=8.40, p=.004,
partial η2=.04. A similar effect was observed for the
forced-choice version of the item,Wald=12.16, p<.001,
OR=1.07, 95 % CI [1.03, 1.11]. Attitudes toward organ
donation showed a similar, though less strong pattern.
Participants who held more favorable attitudes toward
organ donation were more likely to agree that John was
already dead prior to organ removal, F (1, 204)=10.74,
p=.001, partial η2=.05. A similar effect was observed
for the forced-choice version of this item that
approached but did not reach statistical significance,
Wald=2.94, p=.087, OR=1.03, 95 % CI [1.00, 1.07].
The Surgeon Caused John’s Death We observed a sig-
nificant effect of attitudes toward euthanasia such that
participants who had less favorable attitudes toward
euthanasia were more likely to judge that the surgeon
caused John’s death, F (1, 204)=8.09, p=.005, partial
η2=.04. A significant effect was also observed for the
forced-choice version of this item, Wald=6.72, p=.01,
OR=0.95, 95 % CI [0.92, 0.99]. Attitudes toward organ
donation also demonstrated the expected pattern, in
which participants who held more favorable attitudes
toward organ donation were less likely to agree that the
surgeon caused John’s death, F (1, 204)=6.74, p=.01,
partial η2=.03. A similar pattern was observed for the
forced-choice version of this item, Wald=4.51, p=.034,
OR=0.96, 95 % CI [0.92, 1.00].
The Surgeon is Responsible for John’s Death A signif-
icant effect of attitudes toward euthanasia was observed,
such that participants who held less favorable attitudes
were more likely to agree that the surgeon is responsible
for John’s death, F (1, 204)=6.45, p=.012, partial
η2=.03. Likewise, a significant effect of attitudes to-
ward euthanasia was observed for the forced-choice
version of this item, Wald=4.55, p=.033, OR=0.96,
95 % CI [0.92, 1.00]. A similar though less strong
Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations for Outcome Variables (Study 1 and 2)
Primary outcome variables
Likert-type
Study 1 Study 2
Good Bad Good Bad
Mean (SD) n=110 Mean (SD) n=109 Mean (SD) n=127 Mean (SD) n=140
John was already dead before
his organs were removeda
3.6 (1.3) 2.4 (1.2) 2.9 (1.3) 2.4 (1.3)
The surgeon caused John’s death.a 2.1 (1.2) 3.4 (1.3) 2.6 (1.3) 3.6 (1.3)
The surgeon is responsible
for John’s death.a
1.9 (1.1) 3.5 (1.4) 2.5 (1.3) 3.6 (1.4)
Best description for how John died.b 1.6 (1.0) 2.7 (1.2) 1.9 (1.2) 2.6 (1.3)
Primary outcome variables
Forced-choice ratingc













John was already dead before his
organs were removed.
75 (69) 37 (34) 68 (54) 49 (35)
The surgeon caused John’s death. 22 (20) 67 (62) 42 (33) 91 (66)
The surgeon is responsible for John’s death. 15 (14) 69 (64) 42 (33) 92 (66)
BJohn^ is replaced with Bthe patient^ for items in Study 2
a Rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=unsure; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree)
b Rated on a 5-point scale (1=The car accident was the only cause of John’s death; 2=The car accident was mostly the cause of John’s death,
though the surgeon contributed by removing John’s organs; 3=The car accident and the surgeon played an equal role in John’s death; 4=The
surgeon’s removal of John’s organs was mostly the cause of John’s death, though the car accident contributed; 5=The surgeon was the only
cause of John’s death.)
c Number (percentage) responding Byes^ to each statement
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pattern was observed for attitudes toward organ dona-
tion. Participants who were more favorable to organ
donation were less likely to agree that the surgeon is
responsible for John’s death, F (1, 204)=6.16, p=.014,
partial η2=.03. A similar effect was observed for the
forced-choice version of this item that approached but
did not reach statistical significance, Wald=3.63,
p=.057, OR=0.96, 95 % CI [0.92, 1.00].
Best Description of John’s Death We observed a signif-
icant effect of attitudes toward euthanasia whereby par-
ticipants who held less favorable attitudes toward eutha-
nasia were more likely to attribute the cause of John’s
death to both the surgeon and the car accident (vs. the
car accident alone), F (1, 204)=11.00, p=.001, partial
η2=.05. Attitudes toward organ donation, however, was
not a statistically significant predictor of the best de-
scription of John’s death, F (1, 204)=.08, p=.776, par-
tial η2=.00.
Discussion
We found that people’s beliefs about whether an uncon-
scious organ donor was dead and whether organ remov-
al caused death in a hypothetical vignette varied depend-
ing on the moral valence of the vignette. Participants’
judgments about death and causation in this scenario
were assessed in a number of ways including a Likert-
type scale, a forced-choice response set, and a response
set that enabled participants to attribute partial causation
to both the surgeon and the car accident. In every case
we found the predicted effect. Further, individual differ-
ences in participants’ attitudes toward organ donation
and toward euthanasia, in general, predicted judgments
about death and causation regardless of experimental
condition.
A few exceptions were noted in which attitudes to-
ward organ donation did not predict some of the out-
come variables. One possible explanation is that atti-
tudes toward organ donation create a weaker motivation
to reach conclusions about death and causation with
respect to a particular scenario, than do moral evalua-
tions specifically of that same scenario. For example,
when participants read the morally bad scenario, this
likely triggered an immediate negative moral evaluation
of the actors involved, creating the motivation to reach
blame-validating conclusions about death and causa-
tion, which then biased cognitive processes toward
reaching the preferred conclusions. Although general
attitudes toward organ transplantation can trigger the
same process, it is possible that their effects are less
strong. However, given that attitudes toward euthanasia
were statistically significant predictors of judgments of
death and causation for all outcome variables, a second
possibility is that the construct validity of the ODAS
could be improved.
Study 2
The goal of Study 2 was to replicate findings from Study




Participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk.
Based on the results of Study 1 we determined that a
sample size of 223 would have 80% power to detect the
hypothesized effects in Study 2. As in Study 1, we
allowed additional participants to complete the study
to account for attrition. Although 320 participants
responded to the study, the final sample size was re-
duced to 267 after removing participants with incom-
plete responses (n=18), participants who failed at least
one of the four attention checks (n=17), participants
who completed the study more than once (n=2), and
participants who completed Study 1 (as derived from IP
addresses; n=12). Mean age was 33 years (SD =11) and
48 % of participants were female. See Table 1 for
additional demographic and background characteristics.
Procedures, Materials, and Measures
The procedure for Study 2 was identical to Study 1 and
used the same 2 (moral valence) X 2 (order) between-
subjects design. The primary difference between the
studies pertained to the details of the vignette.
Vignette The aim of the vignette in Study 2 was similar
to that in Study 1, except we changed potentially rele-
vant variables, such as whether the patient had a name,
the presence of a family, the role of religious beliefs, and
the surgeon’s motive in the bad condition. Because little
information was provided about the patient in Study 2’s
vignette, the moral valence in the good condition was
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presumably more ambiguous. This allows for a stronger
test of the hypothesis that moral evaluations of organ
transplantation influence judgments of death and causa-
tion because the difference in moral valence between the
good and bad conditions in Study 2 was presumably less
pronounced than it was in Study 1. The scenario
began the same way for all participants:
A homeless man has been struck by a fast-moving
car. He suffered a severe head injury and is now in
the hospital. As a result of the injury, the man is
completely unconscious. He cannot hear or feel
anything, cannot remember or think about any-
thing, and his condition is irreversible. This man
will never wake up. He also cannot breathe with-
out mechanical support, but is on a breathing
machine that keeps his lungs working. Without
the machine, the man’s heart and all of his other
organs would stop within minutes. No family,
contacts, or identification can be found for this
man, so the hospital asked a judge to appoint a
guardian who can make decisions on his behalf.
Then participants read about the circumstances under
which the man’s organs had been removed. Approxi-
mately half of participants read the morally good sce-
nario and half read the morally bad scenario.
[Good condition:] Dr. Jones is the transplant sur-
geon on duty. Knowing that this patient is a can-
didate to donate organs, Dr. Jones discusses this
possibility with the guardian. They both agree that
by giving the gift of life and by saving the lives of
up to 6 other people through organ donation, at
least some good can come from this senseless
tragedy.
With the guardian’s permission, the hospital staff
take the patient to the operating room while he is
still on the breathing machine, and Dr. Jones
removes the patient’s liver, pancreas, both kid-
neys, heart, and lungs, and transplants them into
other patients.
[Bad condition:] Dr. Jones is the transplant sur-
geon on duty. Although he wants to remove the
man’s organs, the court-appointed guardian has
denied permission to do so. Dr. Jones thinks to
himself, BThis bum has contributed nothing to
society. And now he’s here taking up a hospital
bed, soaking up my valuable time and resources,
which he does not deserve. Well, I don’t care what
that guardian says. I’m going to remove his or-
gans, because if I can get one more heart this
month, I’m going to get a huge bonus and I’ll
buy another boat^.
In the middle of the night when the guardian has
left, the hospital staff take the patient to the oper-
ating room while he is still on the breathing ma-
chine, and Dr. Jones removes the patient’s liver,
pancreas, both kidneys, heart, and lungs, and
transplants them into other patients.
Participants completed the same attitudes scales, de-
mographic and background characteristics, and atten-
tion checks as in Study 1. As in Study 1, we emphasized
that there are no right or wrong answers and we are
interested in participants’ personal opinions. We also
stated that the vignettes were fictional at the end of the
study. Coefficient alpha was computed for the ODAS
(α=.91) and ATE (α=.90) scales. The outcome vari-
ables were identical to those in the first study except that
Bthe patient^ was substituted for the name BJohn.^ The
analysis strategy was identical to Study 1.
Results
Randomization Checks
Participants in the morally good vs. bad condition were
not significantly different from each other in regards to
demographic variables, background characteristics, or
attitudes (data not shown).
Effect of Condition, Order, and their Interaction
on Outcome Measures
The Patient was Already Dead As in Study 1, we ob-
served a significant effect of experimental condition on
participants’ Likert rating of whether the patient was
already dead before his organs were removed. (See
Table 2 for means and percentages of outcome
variables for participants in the morally good vs. bad
condition.) Participants in the good condition (vs. bad)
were more likely to agree that the patient was already
dead before his organs were removed, F (1, 255)=
10.81, p=.001, partial η2=.04. No order effects emerged
and the condition by order interaction was non-signifi-
cant. A significant effect of condition was also observed
for the forced-choice version of this item, Wald=11.04,
p<.001, OR=2.43, 95 % CI [1.44, 4.11]. Participants in
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the good condition were over 2 times more likely to state
that the patient was already dead.
The Surgeon Caused the Patient’s Death We observed a
significant effect of condition on participants’ judg-
ments of whether the surgeon caused the patient’s death,
as in Study 1. Relative to those in the bad condition,
participants in the good condition were less likely to
agree that the surgeon caused death, F (1, 255)=37.47,
p<.001, partial η2=.13. No order or interaction effects
emerged. This effect was also observed for the forced-
choice version of this item, Wald=28.16, p<.001, OR=
0.23, 95 % CI [0.14, 0.40]. Participants in the good
condition were 77 % less likely to state that the surgeon
caused John’s death.
The Surgeon is Responsible for the Patient’s Death A
similar pattern was observed for participants’ percep-
tions of whether the surgeon is responsible for the
patient’s death. Participants in the morally good (vs.
bad) condition were less likely to agree that the surgeon
was responsible for death, F (1, 254)=49.40, p<.001,
partial η2=.16. No order or interaction effects emerged.
This effect of condition was observed the forced-choice
version of this item as well, Wald=28.69, p<.001, OR=
0.23, 95 % CI [0.13, 0.39]. Participants in the good
condition were 77 % less likely to state that the surgeon
was responsible for John’s death.
Best Description of the Patient’s Death As in Study 1,
we observed a significant effect of condition on partic-
ipants’ ratings of the best description of the patient’s
death, F (1, 255)=22.82, p<.001, partial η2=.08. While
participants in the morally good condition largely en-
dorsed the car accident as the sole cause of death, those
in the bad condition attributed the patient’s death to both
the car accident and the surgeon. No order effects
emerged and the condition by order interaction was
non-significant.
Effects of Attitudes Toward Organ Donation
and Euthanasia on Outcome Measures
As in Study 1, attitudes toward organ donation and
euthanasia were included in all of the models to assess
whether these variables predicted responses to the out-
come variables over and above the effect of experimen-
tal condition. A small positive correlation was again
observed between the ODAS and ATE, r (259)=.22,
p<.001.
The Patient was Already Dead Similar to Study 1, we
observed a significant effect of attitudes toward eutha-
nasia such that participants who held less favorable
attitudes toward euthanasia were less likely to agree that
the patient was dead prior to the organ removal surgery,
F (1, 255)=15.14, p<.001, partial η2=.06. A similar
effect was observed for the forced-choice version of
the item, Wald=10.64, p=.001, OR=1.05, 95 % CI
[1.02, 1.09]. As in Study 1, attitudes toward organ
donation showed a less consistent pattern. Attitudes
toward organ donation were not significant predictors
of agreement that the patient was dead prior to organ
removal for the Likert version of this item, F (1, 255)=
2.11, p=.148, partial η2=.01. However, we observed a
significant effect of attitudes toward organ donation for
the forced-choice version, whereby participants who
held more favorable attitudes toward organ donation
were more likely to agree that the patient was already
dead, Wald=3.91, p=.048, OR=1.03, 95 % CI [1.00,
1.07].
The Surgeon Caused the Patient’s Death The expected
pattern was observed for attitudes toward euthanasia
such that participants who had less favorable attitudes
were more likely to judge that the surgeon caused the
patient’s death, F (1, 255)=9.33, p=.002, partial
η2=.04. Likewise, a significant effect was observed for
the forced-choice version of this item, Wald=4.99,
p=.026, OR=0.97, 95 % CI [0.94, 1.00]. A similar
though less strong pattern was observed for attitudes
toward organ donation, in which participants who held
more favorable attitudes toward organ donation were
less likely to agree that the surgeon caused death, though
this effect did not reach statistical significance, F (1,
255)=2.57, p=.110, partial η2=.01. A significant effect
was observed for the forced-choice version of this item,
Wald=4.15, p=.042, OR=0.97, 95 % CI [0.94, 1.00].
The Surgeon is Responsible for the Patient’s Death A
significant effect of attitudes toward euthanasia was
observed whereby participants who held less favorable
attitudes were more likely to agree that the surgeon is
responsible for the patient’s death, F (1, 254)=9.68,
p=.002, partial η2=.04. The expected effect was also
observed for the forced-choice version of this item,
Wald=6.46, p=.011, OR=0.96, 95 % CI [0.93, 0.99].
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Participants who held more favorable attitudes toward
organ donation were less likely to agree that the surgeon
is responsible for the patient’s death in the Likert version
of this item, though this effect did not reach statistical
significance F (1, 254)=3.47, p=.064, partial η2=.01.
However, a significant effect was observed for the
forced-choice version of this item, Wald=4.75,
p=.029, OR=0.96, 95 % CI [0.93, 1.00].
Best Description of the Patient’s Death Finally, we ob-
served a significant effect of attitudes toward euthanasia
whereby participants who held less favorable attitudes
toward euthanasia were more likely to attribute the
cause of the patient’s death to both the surgeon and the
car accident (vs. the car accident alone), F (1, 255)=
7.34, p=.007, partial η2=.03. We also observed a sig-
nificant effect of attitudes toward organ donation,
whereby participants who held more favorable attitudes
toward organ donation were more likely to attribute the
cause of the patient’s death to the car accident alone (vs.
both the car accident and the surgeon), F (1, 255)=9.89,
p=.002, partial η2=.04.
Discussion
The findings of Study 1 were replicated in Study 2.
Importantly, in Study 2 we changed several salient char-
acteristics of the vignette, including the role of religious
beliefs, the presence of a family, whether the patient had
a name, and the surgeon’s motive in the bad condition,
which was to gain a bonus rather than prejudice. This
replication with a different sample and different vi-
gnettes provides further evidence for the role of moral
evaluations in people’s judgments of death and
causation.
General Discussion
People randomly assigned to read a story about organ
removal from a patient in irreversible apneic coma that
was framed in a morally good (vs. bad) manner were
more likely to say that the donor was dead and that
surgery did not cause death, even though the physiolog-
ic state of the donor and physical circumstances of organ
removal were exactly the same in both the good and bad
versions of the story. Second, individual differences in
attitudes toward organ donation and toward euthanasia
both independently predicted people’s beliefs about
death and causation in an organ removal scenario, re-
gardless of experimental condition. Thus, the results of
the experimental manipulation of moral valence, and the
associations between the attitude scales and judgments
of death and causation (regardless of experimental con-
dition) mutually reinforce each other. These results were
replicated in a second sample of participants, using
different vignettes in which the contrast in moral va-
lence between the good and bad conditions was less
pronounced. Taken together, our findings support our
hypothesis that moral evaluations of organ transplanta-
tion affect judgments of death and causation.
Although we have posed our hypotheses and
interpreted our results in light of the motivated reason-
ing framework, these results are also relevant to a com-
peting theoretical framework, Knobe’s person-as-mor-
alist model [9]. We will address both the motivated
reasoning and the person-as-moralist models below as
potential explanations of these results, and then discuss
their relevance to bioethical debates about death and
organ transplantation.
Death and Motivated Reasoning
Our findings can be conceptualized in terms of motivat-
ed reasoning, in which any preference, wish, or desire to
reach a particular conclusion impacts cognition in a way
that biases the observer toward reaching the preferred
conclusion. Participants differed in their general atti-
tudes toward organ transplantation and euthanasia, as
reflected in scores on the ODAS and ATE scales. Their
favorable or unfavorable opinions toward these prac-
tices created the motivation to interpret relevant aspects
of the vignette in a way that would validate their prior
attitudes. Specifically, those who were more favorable
to organ transplantation were more likely to believe that
the comatose patient was already dead and that organ
removal was not the cause of death, while those who
were less favorable to euthanasia were motivated to
reach the opposite conclusions. Similarly, the experi-
mental manipulation of moral valence likely triggered
spontaneous moral evaluations of organ removal in that
specific scenario. Those participants who were random-
ized to read the morally bad versions of the stories likely
judged the surgeon’s actions to bemorally blameworthy,
reflected in their higher agreement that the surgeon is
responsible for the patient’s death (Table 2). This moral
assessment created the motivation to interpret the sce-
nario in a way that would validate that assessment,
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specifically by concluding that the patient was alive
prior to organ removal and that the surgeon caused the
patient’s death by removing organs. A parallel process
occurred in the good condition, where participants were
motivated to reach different conclusions about death and
causation that would validate their different moral
evaluations.
The effect sizes across experimental condition in
Study 1 were consistently larger than those in Study 2
(reported above; see also Table 2 to compare means and
percentages across conditions). This is consistent with
and predicted by the model of motivated reasoning. In
Study 1, the good condition was presumably more ob-
viously good than in Study 2, because the patient
wanted to be a donor and the family consented to
donation, whereas in Study 2 the good condition was
presumably more ambiguous, because there was no
information about the donor’s prior wishes. Thus, in
the good condition of Study 1 there was a stronger
positive moral evaluation that organ removal was per-
missible (compared to the good condition of Study 2),
creating a stronger motivation to reach conclusions
about death and causation that would validate that
moral evaluation. This stronger motivation in Study 1
(vs. Study 2), in turn, resulted in a larger difference in
judgments of death and causation across condition,
reflected in larger effect sizes in Study 1. In other
words, the greater contrast in moral valence between
the two conditions in Study 1 (vs. Study 2) yielded a
greater contrast in motivations to interpret the scenario
differently in the two conditions, which in turn is
reflected in the larger differences in judgments of
death and causation, and hence the larger effect sizes
in Study 1.
Finally, blame-validation is a particular manifestation
of the more general phenomenon of motivated cogni-
tion. In the specific experimental contexts reported here,
it is likely that participants were motivated to blame an
agent, thus influencing the outcome of judgments of
death and causation. However, it is also plausible that
the phenomenon under investigation is not specifically
tied to blame-validation, but is part of a more general
pattern of motivated cognition in which people (mis)
interpret a variety of relevant facts about death, causa-
tion, and intention so as to allow desired practices (such
as organ removal) to appear consistent with traditional
norms (such as the prohibition against intentionally
causing death; cf. [16]). We aim to explore these ques-
tions in future research.
Moral Concept of Death and the Person-as-Moralist
Model
Although the motivated reasoning framework is well-
suited for explaining our results, an alternative explana-
tion must also be considered. Veatch has argued [7, 22]
that themeaning of the word Bdead^ has evolved in such
a way that it now embodies a moral concept. Although
Bdead^ retains its biological connotation in most con-
texts, when used in the context of organ donation, Bthe
new and different meaning [has] little to do with biolo-
gy… The word dead has come to mean – for legal,
ethical, and public policy purposes – ‘having lost full
moral standing as a member of the human community’^
([22], p. 10). Full membership in the human moral
community affords certain protections, such as the right
not to be killed or to not have one’s organs removed.
Therefore, to assert that a person is dead within this
context is simply to assert Bthat it is morally, legally,
and socially acceptable to remove organs … and that
those who do so are not guilty of murder^ ([22], p. 11).
In a similar vein, Knobe has argued that people’s
basic competencies in making sense of the world, par-
ticularly in making sense of other people and their
causal interactions with the world, are suffused with
moral considerations [9]. That is, certain key concepts
involved in the explanation of behavior, such as inten-
tion and causation, are partially moral concepts, rather
than value-neutral factual concepts. Importantly, Knobe
argues that the role of moral judgments in shaping
people’s intuitions about intentionality, causation, and
related concepts, should not be considered bias or an
interfering factor as on the motivated reasoning model.
Rather, those moral judgments are part of the normal
and proper functioning of our competencies, and indeed,
Knobe writes, BIt seems that we are moralizing creatures
through and through^ ([9], p. 328). Hence he describes
his view as the person-as-moralist model, in contrast
with what he calls the person-as-scientist model, ac-
cording to which these concepts are interpreted as val-
ue-neutral, factual concepts.
Knobe’s person-as-moralist model states that moral
considerations are properly embedded within the con-
cepts of causation, freedom, intention, and other basic
concepts, though not including death. Assuming that it
is generalized to include the concept of death much as
Veatch has described it, this model would explain our
results as follows. In the good condition, participants
presumably considered organ removal to be Bmorally,
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legally, and socially acceptable^ ([22], 11). In so doing,
they thereby judged that the donor is no longer a full
member of the human moral community; therefore, they
appropriately judged the donor to be dead, in accor-
dance with Veatch’s proposed new definition. In the
bad condition, the surgeon’s reprehensible motives and
the lack of consent would lead most people to believe
that organ removal is not Bmorally, legally, and socially
acceptable^, hence, most people would not judge that
the donor in this specific context is dead. Similar expla-
nations may be offered for the relations between the
attitude scales and judgments of death. For example,
those participants who had more favorable attitudes
toward organ donation, in general, were presumably
more likely to consider the specific instance of organ
removal to be morally permissible (perhaps even in the
bad condition), and hence, thereby judged that the donor
is dead.
The person-as-moralist model’s explanation of our
results is very different than the motivated reasoning
model, which posits a reasoning process that biases
participants’ judgments toward validating a moral eval-
uation they have already made. In essence, the motivat-
ed reasoning model posits a performance error, whereas
on the person-as-moralist model, our participants were
not engaged in biased processing at all, but were cor-
rectly performing basic competencies and correctly ap-
plying core concepts. The results of our studies extend
the application of the motivated reasoning and the
person-as-moralist models into a new domain, that of
judgments about death, but it is not possible to tease
apart the two explanations from our experimental evi-
dence alone. Further theoretical and empirical research
will be needed to distinguish the explanatory power of
the two models.
Although this is an important theoretical question for
moral psychology, it is essential to understand that re-
gardless of whether the best explanation is the motivated
reasoning or person-as-moralist framework (or some
combination of them), on both theoretical frameworks,
moral evaluations of organ transplantation influence
judgments of death. This has significant implications
for the bioethical debate about death and organ
transplantation.
Death and Organ Transplantation
According to the dominant interpretation of these issues,
neurological criteria for death do not reflect a social
construction or a legal fiction designed for the purpose
of facilitating organ transplantation. Rather, the deter-
mination of death by neurological criteria is grounded in
sound biomedical science and philosophical reasoning,
and is justified independently of ethical concerns about
organ transplantation [2, 3, 23]. Because brain dead
donors are in fact dead – as a matter of biology – it
follows that the removal of organs while the donor
remains on the ventilator and with a spontaneously
beating heart does not violate the dead donor rule.
However, this interpretation is inconsistent with a
body of empirical evidence showing that patients meet-
ing diagnostic standards for brain death retain the ca-
pacity for the integrated functioning of the organism as a
whole in its maintenance of physiologic stability and
resistance of entropy; thus, they are biologically alive [5,
6, 24]. These functions include gas exchange at the
alveoli, cellular respiration, nutrition, wound healing,
febrile responses to infection, hypertensive, tachycardic,
and endocrine responses to incision, neurohormonal
regulation of free water homeostasis, growth and sexual
maturation in children, and the gestation of healthy
fetuses in pregnant women [5, 6]. Rather than being a
scientifically justified claim about biology, several
scholars have argued that the brain death doctrine em-
bodies or reflects moral evaluations, in particular, that it
is permissible to remove vital organs from patients in
this devastating condition [7, 8].
Our results provide experimental evidence in support
of the assertion that moral evaluations of organ trans-
plantation influence judgments about death and causa-
tion, casting doubt on the psychological legitimacy of
the mainstream view which holds that neurological
criteria for death are justified independently of ethical
concerns about organ transplantation. Indeed, there is a
long-standing criticism that criteria for death have been
redefined in order to allow vital organ procurement to
appear consistent with the dead donor rule (cf. [5, 25]).
Our experimental results support this interpretation of
the literature: Rather than concluding that organ removal
is permissible because the donor is dead, people may
believe that the donor is dead because they believe organ
removal to be permissible.
On the motivated reasoning model, the influence of
moral evaluations on judgments of death is an error in
reasoning (something like a reverse naturalistic fallacy),
whereas on the person-as-moralist model, the embed-
ding of moral evaluations within judgments of death
does not reflect an error, since death and causation are
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partly moral concepts. However, both explanatory
models reinforce an important challenge to the main-
stream view; namely, scientific or technical expertise
grants no particular epistemic, moral, or democratic
authority in resolving moral questions [24]. Regardless
of whether moral evaluations are appropriately embed-
ded within the concept of death, or if current neurolog-
ical criteria for death reflect motivated reasoning in
which the concept of death is reinterpreted to allow
organ procurement to appear consistent with the dead
donor rule, our current policies embody or reflect im-
plicit moral evaluations that are not explicitly acknowl-
edged as such. Instead, brain death is treated as if it were
an established Bscientific fact.^ But in so doing, the
underlying moral judgments are hidden from view, pre-
cluding explicit moral and democratic discourse regard-
ing why the removal of vital organs from patients in this
devastating condition is ethically permissible, if it is,
and if not, then why not.
Limitations and Future Directions
Limitations of this research include possible concerns
about generalizability of the sample due to use of
Mechanical Turk, and an online survey environment
that may result in potential problems with participant
attention. With respect to the first potential limitation,
our samples reflected a broad demographic array by age,
ethnicity, education, religious beliefs, and other charac-
teristics. Furthermore, numerous traditional psycholog-
ical findings regarding judgment and decision making
have been replicated onMechanical Turk, suggesting its
reliability and utility as a data source [18]. Regarding
attention in an online survey environment, we used
attention-checks to control for this factor, however, we
cannot rule out whether some participants were multi-
tasking and perhaps not completely engaged with the
survey.
An additional potential limitation of this research
is that the bad versions of the vignettes are unreal-
istic, which might be perceived to limit the applica-
tion of the findings. However, the aim was not to
describe realistic scenarios in order to gauge peo-
ple’s opinions about organ donation. Rather, the aim
was to manipulate the independent variable of moral
valence in order to experimentally test the hypothe-
sis that moral valence influences judgments of death
and causation. By manipulating this independent
variable while holding all other relevant variables
constant (and by replicating the findings with differ-
ent vignettes), we can conclude that differences in
judgments of death and causation were caused by
the difference in moral valence across the scenarios.
Furthermore, the experimental results must be
interpreted in conjunction with the correlational
findings in which attitudes toward organ donation
and euthanasia independently predicted judgments
of death and causation, regardless of experimental
condition. When taken together, these results estab-
lish the basic effect, that moral evaluations influence
and predict judgments of death and causation in an
organ procurement scenario. In future research we
aim to clarify the parameters that moderate and
constrain this basic effect.
Finally, there are several differences between the
good and bad versions of the vignettes in both studies
which are bound up in what we have collectively de-
scribed as Bmoral valence^, such as prejudice, consent,
and the surgeon’s moral character. In future research we
also aim to clarify the role that these distinct components
play in thinking about death and causation in the organ
procurement context.
Conclusion
To our knowledge, the studies reported here are the first
to experimentally explore the effects of moral evalua-
tions of organ transplantation on beliefs about death and
causation. As predicted, we found that moral evalua-
tions of a specific organ removal scenario, as well as
individual differences in attitudes toward organ dona-
tion and toward euthanasia, can influence and predict
judgments about death and causation.
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